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Taxes on land and real property are among the most ancient taxes of
which we have record. To treatthem in a historical context is presumptuous,
in a paper as short as this. And yet it is important to set our property
tax problems of today in
The focus will be on the
largely to the Twentieth
passed the transition of
a historical frame, limited though it may be.
United States, and the time span will be confined
Century. Short as it is, this period has encom-
our economy, and its tax systems, from one
dominated by rural institutions to an economy dominated by cities, by
wealth held in intangible forms, and by a population remote from the
land in its habits and occupations. Still the property tax persists.
Why? This paper will attempt a tentative answer, and will explore some
of the economic and social forces that have sustained the property tax
in a post-industrial society.
The economic justification for the property tax can rest on several
different bases. It can be regarded as a wealth tax, singularly appro-
priate to an economy in which wealth is primarily represented by land.
Alternatively, it can derive its justificattin from its relationship
to the income from property. The preferred approach is in part a con-
sequence of the stage of development of the society. In a non-monetized
* Paper prepared for Seminar on r~ProPertY Tax Issues in the ‘o’s”>
sponsored by the Regional Work Group on Property Taxation, Southern
Land Economics Research Committee, College Station, Texas, May 23-24, 1973.society, or one in early stages of the development of an exchange
economy, there is a tendency to impute a person’s income from his
wealth, especially from hia tangible wealth. Acres of land, number of
houses, number of cattle, horses, or sheep--these become the indicators
of relative ability to pay taxes. Even in urban settings this habit
persists. In the cities of the Middle East today a measure of a man’s
importance is the number of keys he has, signifying the number of
houses in his possession.
This focus onwealth as an indicator of ability to pay is
appropriate to an economy in which technologicalconversion rates in
production processes are believed to be largely outside of man’s control.
Crops are a function of weather; the wealth of mines and the sea are
lumped together with wild game and their capture regarded as a matter
of luck - the fruits of the chaae.
As the economy becomes more commercialized, the emphaais shifts
from the stock of wealth to the flow of income. This process is
accelerated by the growth of technological diversity. Management
modifies nature. Crop yields respond to tillage, seed selection, and
soil and water conservation. The concept of fertility is transformed from
that of an independentvariable to that of a dependent variable. Tech-
niques of sanitation, transport and food storage support much larger urban
populations. The imputation of income from malth is eroded, and tangi-
ble property is no longer a valid measure of ability to pay taxes.
The consequences and contrasts of this transformationcan be seen
in the different ways in which the property tax is administered in the
United Kingdom and the United States. In the UK the tax on property is
levied on the %ncome from property. Wealth in property is measured in
multiples of its annual income. “Twenty years purchase” may be theanswer given by a British farmer to the question, ‘TJhatis the value of
this land?” Meaning, of course, twenty times the annual net rent.
In the United States, the property tax is levied on the capital
value of the property, reflecting a frontier tradition, the prevalence
of owner-occupiers,and the relatively late development of an efficient
rental market.
Apart from these different approaches to the roles of wealth and
income, the property tax can also be justified as a “user tax”, on the
basis of benefits received. The ‘!usetf in this case is the use of
government -- of the organized structure of the society that promotes
stability, communication,and the security of life and property.
This view of the property tax as a user tax was especially
appropriate m the American frontier. The first functions of government
were to establish order, provide roads, and establish a system for the
registration of rights in land, minerals, or water. Early in our history
a fourth function was added: The provision of schools. These were all
local services, clearly beneficial to the community, and with benefits
flowing in a relatively egalitarian manner to all residents.
In both our early cities and on the farms, it can be argued that
the correspondence between tax costs and benefits received from the
expenditure of funds raised through the property tax were roughly





A widespread diffusion of rights in property,
toward less rather than more concentration as
Income flows that are roughly proportional to
and a trend
settlement progresses.
property rights.3.) Comparatively low levels of geographic mobility, insuring that
those who pay property taxes will be the ones who benefit from
slow-maturing public enterprises like roads and sohools.
4.) Relative uniformity in life styles and family size.
4.) Relative uniformity in work schedules and the availability of
leisure time.
Today, the functions of government have changed with the changing
social order, and the uses of government cover a much wider range. In
the early days of settlement, government was a “producers good”. It
provided inputs into the production process through the creation of an
infrastructure that was essential to the development of an industrial
society.
Government today is still a major provider of productive inputs,
but it has also taken on responsibility for the provision of services
that in an earlier era were regarded as consumers goods, or as proper
functions of the household, not the firm.
The user of government today benefits from pollution control,
land use planning, environmental protection, welfare programs, parks
and recreational facilities and many other governmental functions for
which the incidence of benefits is sharply differentiated. Many
government services have become . “consumers goods.”
As these new structures and functions develop it is understandable
that questions should be raised about the suitability of the property
tax for the financing of public services. We can identify many reasons
for this shift in the appropriate basis for fiscal support, but one
stands out: the dramatic transformation in attitudes toward the5
proper division of responsibility
sector for health and welfare.
This brief survey of some of
of the property tax points up the
determinants of needed reforms in
between the public and the private
the major forces affecting the role
significance of social changes as
tax and fiscal systems,
The shift in attitudes toward the purposes of land classification
and assessment provide one of the most revealing illustrations of the
changing responsibilities of government. In virtually all countries
the initial interest in land classification originated in a desire
to know how valuable or productive the lsnd was, in order to collect the
maximum amount of tax. This was true, for example, in the Roman empire,
\
in Britain under William the Conqueror, in British India, and on the
American frontier.
Beginning in the 1930’s in the United States, there has been a major
shift in the uses made of assessed values. They are still necessary as
a basis for tax levies, but they have also become a base for the deter-
mination of how money should be disbursed in the form of state aids to
local governments. Classification and assessment today serve the dual
functions of distributing tax burdens and distributing central government
revenues that are shared with local government.
This shift is a reflection of fundamental changes in income flows,
in the structure of business firms, and in the division of responsibilities
for education, welfare and social services between the family and the
state, and among levels of government. As a result, property tax
assessment must reckon with both fiscal and welfare consequences. This
is one reason why concern about the property tax has taken on a newdimension in our generation.
Another reason grows out of the almost world-wide phenomenon of
inflation. It is particularly difficult to administer a property tax
fairly in times of inflation since persistent inflation undermines it,
in two ways:
a) By insuring that the assessment process can never keep up with
market values
b) By creating an artificial demand for land as an inflation
hedge, thus demoralizing conventional tests of value based
on productivity, and location.
Because the property tax is levied on the basis of the most durable
of assets, it is axiomatic that its effectiveness is greatest in political
systems that can provide political and fiscal stability. Property values
represent capitalized expectations. Where expectations are subject to
great uncertainty, a tax based on land values or land income is placed
under great stress. If inflation is expected, property taxation often
bec~mes perverse. For inflation demoralizes all of the traditional
calculations that relate property values to expected income, thus
destroying the economic rationale for the tax.
We have known periods of inflated property values in our history
as a nation, but we have never experienced acute or sustained inflation.
Our property tax system has never had to cope with land values driven to
dizzy heights by frightened investors. We still do not have to reckon
with the kind of inflation that wrecks currencies and destroya credit
systems, but we have had enough inflation in recent years to raise
doubts aboutar conventional use of market values as a basis for property
tax assessment.One effect of inflation can be illustrated by a comparison of the
differences that result from use of alternative measures of value, in
assessment. We have already noted that the annual rental value is the
base used for property tax assessment in the United Kingdom. In contrast,
a capital value base is used in the United States (and in Canada, South
Africa, Germany, Austria and Denmark).
A major difference between these two bases is thetreatmentof idle
land and vacant improvements., In the British system, the tax is based on
the rental value in actual present use. A vacant property is not taxed.
In the US version, the tax is based on market value. This presumably
reflects capitalized net income expected from the most profitable use of
the property but not necessarilyfrom its present use. A vacant property
in the US system pays taxes as if it were occupied.
A capital value base makes different demands on valuation and
assessment processes than does an annual rental value base. For example,
a threat of inflation can enter into the property tax base much more
readily if the capital value base is used than if rental value is the
base.
On the other hand, a rental value base tends to follow the business
cycle with less time lag and with narrower deviations than is the case
with a capital value base. The problem of tax delinquency is thus more
acute in countries using a capital value base. There may be no close
relationship between current income and the obligation to pay taxes when
a capital value base is used, and especially in the downswings of the
business cycle. Our experience between 1920 and 1940 is still vivid
proof of the damage that can result.
In contrast, the capital value base works to advantage in a newly8
settled area, or in a region in which speculative buying and selling of
land precedes any actual development. The British system, using a net
annual rental income as a base, would have yielded very little revenue
for many years during the period of frontier settlement in the US or
Canada. This was a period of heavy capital requirements for the
creation of a rural infrastructure. A tax base reflecting future ex-
pected income was better suited to the forced saving requirement that
was a precondition for local community development on the frontier.
We have a property tax system, in short, that was well adapted to
the needs of a frontier nation. Questions are now properly raised
about its suitability in an urbanized economy, in wlichdemands for
land reflect widely different uses, tastes, and concepts of value.
We have learned that it is impossible to practice forestry in a system
of private property in which taxes are based on capital values. We
may now be in the process of learning that it is similarly impossible
to practice agriculture if land values are based on non-agricultural
considerations and if the property tax is based on capital values.
These doubts are reinforced by recent trends in the diffe.r.6ntiation
of expected capital gains. Throughout the 19th century and well into the
20th century the pattern of US development increased the number of
communities in which capital gains in land were being experienced.
These were diffused throughout the country, and contributed to a wide
geographic dispersal of the value-creating influences of public invest-
ments in community services and a transport network, first rail and
then road.9
Beginning with the Depression of the 1930’s and accelerating after
World War II, this pattern has been reversed. The wealth-creating in-
fluences of urbanization and population concentration are being experi-
enced by a decreasing number of large urban centers. The enjoyment of
capital gains is being concentrated, in a geographic sense, in fewer
and fewer places.
This is paralleled by a concentration of property rights which has
accelerated the aggregation of capital gains in land in fewer and fewer
hands. The increase in the number of stockholders in the nation’s
businesses has been well publicized by banking and brokerage firms and
trade associations. It is rarely pointed out that one must evaluate this
statistic in terms of the associated decline in the number of proprieta~
business firms and the small role they play today in the ownership of
non-farm commercial and
residential real estate
tively few owners. The
industrial real property. Non-farm and non-
is highly concentrated in the hands of a rela-
pace of this concentration has been enormously
increased by the trend toward corporate mergers.
The concentration of ownership of real property can be measured in
two dimensions. We can look on it in
its concentration or dispersion among
by acres or value.
Alternatively, we can weight the
a cross-sectional fashion, measuring
owners at a point in time, weighted
concentration index by estimates
of prospective degrees of value
It is in this second sense that
dramatically. The ownership of
appreciation or capital gain over time.
the degree of concentration has progressed
the real estate of the United States that10
has the greatest prospect for future increases in value is more highly
concentrated than is total real estate.
The reason is not hard to find. By adopting a progressive income
tax and a flat-rate capital gains tax we have made the rewards from
capital gains exceedingly rich for the high income investor. By this
differential reward system we have insured that the wealthiest investors
can bid the highest prices for the opportunity to share in prospective
capital gains. This policy has made it inevitable that ownership of real
estate with the ripest prospects for capital gains will concentrate in
the hands of a small .mumber of wealttyowners.
The feed back loop in this tax policy is alao worth noting. It
guarantees that the higher the income tax bracket the greater the incen-
tive to devise investment undertakings that will insure a capital gain.
The witness to the success of this inverse policy dimension in provided
by large scale~operty developers who can command a critical mass of
capital large enough to guarantee a capital gain. The large-scale
suburban shopping center need not succeed in a retailing sense if it
succeeds in polarizing capital investment in its neighborhood sufficiently
to guarantee success as a real estate venture. The key officials in the
largest department store complexes today are land use planning and real
estate officers.
The pattern is similar in housing. A builder who constructs a few
dozen houses a year is at the mercy of market forces. A developer who
can command the capital needed to construct a development of thousands
of houses can to a significant extent create his own market. The fruits
of community-createdvalue are being received by fewer and fewer owners.
This too raises questions about the suitabilityof a property tax in a
system that deals so inequitably with capital gains.11
We have noted that inconception,and especially in implementation
the American version of the property tax has been a rural institution.
A remarkable testimony to its durability, flexibility,and adaptability
is the ease with which the property tax made the transition to an urban-
industrial age.
One explanation is the automobile. The automobile translated the
demand for housing and transport into a demand for suburban, single-
family homes. In these suburbs, the degree of reliance on the property
tax for governmental revenues has reached levels that approach those of
the most rural counties in the 19th century. This revenue went over-
whelmingly into roads and schools, that is, into the classic infra-
structural investment forms that are urged upon developing countries or
regions.
The contribution of the property tax to suburban capital formation
in the United States reached levels of significance historically attri-
buted to the land tax in Japan after the Meiji restoration. It has been
the major tool for the diversion of disposable personal income into
productive capital investments in suburban America. This waa how suburbia
saved for its infrastructure.
In this sense, the history of heavy
early stages of development was repeated
suburbs. Their principal attraction has
reliance on a property tax during
in mid-Twentieth century American
been good schools and good roads.
The property tax has been one
savings that gave them life.
It is in this sense that
of the principal tools used to force the
the suburbs .ofthe 20th century have replaced12
the frontier of the 19th centuryin keeping alive the economic rationale
for the property tax. To the extent that this suburban way of life is
being questioned we can also expect to find questions raised shout the
property tax and its impact on land use and the structure of cities.
One immediate impact of the property tax on the size and shape of
our cities is seen in its influence on the “build quick and unload”
practice of real estate developers. If property tax rates can be
kept low, or reduced by preferential assessment as in the Minnesota
“Green Acres” law of 1967, this lengthens the planning horizon within
which speculative buyers can hold land in anticipation of capital gains.
Property taxes can be a major fraction of the holding costs of real
estate purchased for speculative purposes. The lower his opportunity
cost of capital, the greater the importance of the rate at which property
is taxed, in the eyes of an investor in a high income tax bracket.
This interaction between the opportunity cost of capital, expected
rates of appreciation in real estate value, and property tax rates can
be illustrated by the following examples.
Assuming an opportunity cost of capital of 6%, the interest income
of a married investor with over $88,000 of taxable income would have been
taxed at 60% in 1972, leaving him a net income after tax of 2.4% on his
investment.
If his alternative is an investment in realestate yielding a
capital gain that will not be taxed at more than 35%, then the in-
difference point in his decision to invest in land will be an expected
rate of capital gain that will yield him a net after-tax income of13
2.4% or more. This would be an annual rate of land value increase of
3.69% (65% of 3.69s2.4).
If the tax rate is 1% of market value of the land per year, this
raises the needed rate of capital value appreciation to 4.69%.per year
for the land purchase to be an attractive investment. A tax rate of
2% raises it to 5.69, and 3% to 6.69.
To use an agricultural example, the taxes levied on farm real
estate in the
1971 averaged
Delta stateaof Mississippi, Arkansas and Louisiana in




return of 3.69 yields a carrying cost of slightly
cost of capitaltijusted for preferential capital
plus property taxes).
At this rate the land is an attractive investment if it is expected
to double in value in 18 years.
If the tax rate is $1.89 per $100 of value (the 1971 rate on agri-
cultural land in the Lake states of Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota),
the carrying cost rises to 5.58% per year. For land to be an attractive
investment at this rate it must
A tax rate of 4% of market
7.69%. The current rate of tax
double in value in 12 years.
value would result in a carrying cost of
on some urban and suburban properties in
the Metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul approaches 4%. For
land to be an attractive investment at this rate it must double in value
in 9 years.
If the nominal opportunity cost of capital is not 6% but 8%, the
indifference point between interest income and a capital gain for a
wealthy investor (60% marginal tax rate or 35% capital14
gains tax rate) becomes 4.92% or just under 5%. A property tax rate of
3% of market value per year would thus virtually wipe out any advantage
gained by favored capital gains tax treatment. The lesson is clear.
If the property tax rate islept low, a wealthy investor can derive an
advantage from the preferential tax treatment of captal gains.
This builds in a powerful incentive for commercial real estate
developers to use political power to secure favorably low tax rates.
To the extent that they succeed this throws an added burden on tax-
payers who cannot qualify for the lower rates. The preferential taxa-
tion of farm land in urbanizing areas has usually been promoted as a
device to preserve agriculture and open space. Its principal result
is to make the preferentially taxed land more attractive to speculators
(including some farmer owners), thus attracting capital that is interested
in a quick turnover and not in a long run productive investment. This
further discredits the property tax.
The growing discrepancy in rates at which property is taxed in
different states and regions is another reason why the property tax
is being questioned severely today. The property tax is least
important in the Southeastern United States. It is most important in
the New England and Great Lake States and in the Northern Great Plains.
The relative importance of the property tax has been heavily influenced
by the structure of government adopted when the states were first formed.
Where the Massachusetts-Connecticut-NewYork constitutional pattern was




Where the Virginia pattern was followed, the localunits
were relatively weak, and so was reliance on the property15
These differences were accentuated by the greatly expanded demand
for schooling in the last third of the 19th century, and especially
after 1920. Where the benefits of the property tax were local, visible,
and received by those who paid the taxes, taxpayers were willing to tax
themselves quite heavily. This was especially the case with suburban
schools, and in rural areas where family sized owner-operated farms
predominated. The level of these taxes is surprisingly high.
Annual taxes per acre on farm land in the New England states and the
Great Lake States average about 2 per cent of current market price. In
many prosperous suburbs
cent.
In 1971, farm land
the rate on residential properties exceeds 3 per
in the Great Lskes states averaged approximately
$260 per acre, and property taxes $4.92 per acre. An investor achieving
a net rate of return of 5 per cent on his capital would need to invest
$98 to earn enough to pay the tax on one acre. If there was no tax,
he could afford to pay $98 more per acre for the land, or 38 per cent
1/
more than the current market price in 1971.-
In North Eastern and North Central city suburbs, current annual
property taxes cluster in the $1,000 to $2,000 range for single family
homes in the $30,000 to $60,000 class. If we ignore the differential
effect of deductibility of property taxes on personal income tax returns,
the current rate of taxation is roughly equivalent to an annual sum that
would support an additional $20,000 to $30,000 in capital value.
~/ These calculations and those that follow are based on Farm Real
Estate Market Developments, USDA, CD-77, July 1972 and Farm Real Estate
——
— — —. —
Taxes, USDA, RET-12, February 1973.16
As with the farm land, this ranges from one-third to one-half of current
market prices for these homes, depending on the capitalization rate used.
In the Lake States, to be more specific, an abolition of all property
taxes would justify a 35 to 50 per cent increase in the per acre price of
farm land and in the market price of suburban single family homes.
The contrast with states of the South, including Oklahoma and Texas,
is dramatic. In none of the states of the Appalachian region, the Southeast,
the Mississippi Delta, or the Southern Plains did property taxes on farm
land reach one per cent of market value in 1971. In seven of the fourteen
states taxes were under one-half of one per cent of market value. For the
region as a whole, the average is under 0.6 of one percent, or approximately
one-third of the level prevailing in the Northeastern and Lake States.
An extreme contrast is provided by the Delta States of Mississippi,
Arkansas and Louisiana. Property taxes on farm land in these three states
have been falling steadily for 40 years. In 1930 they were roughly equal
to the tax per $100 of land value in the Lake States ($1.57 and $1.62,
respectively). In 1971 the tax level in the Delta States had fallen to
$0.34 per $100 of value, or less than one-fifth of the level prevailing
in the Lake States ($1.89 per $100 of market value).
The income required to pay the property tax on farm land in the
Delta States would have supported an additional land value of $20 per
acre in 1971 if capitalized at 5%. The average market value in 1971
was $275 per acre. Abolition of all property taxes on fsrm land would
have added only about 7 percent to the value of Delta land. Contrast17
this with the 38 per cent increase in farm land values that could have
been expected to result from abolition of all property taxes in the Lake
States in 1971.
The significance of these calculations bears heavily on any attempt
to use property tax incentives to achieve non-revenue goals. Preferential
tax policies to protect critical areas, promote the maintenance of open
space, compel the productive use of idle land or preserve agriculture
have little prospect of success if tax burdens are low, and falling.
It is not surprising to find,
almost the only states in the
tial taxation of farm land in
for example, that Florida and Texas are
South that have used any system of preferen-
order to protect agricultural land from
urban encroachment. Tax rates in general in the South have been so low,
and falling so steadily, that they have been an open invitation to spec-
ulators, and have minimized the effectiveness of tax policy in guiding
land use.
One consequence of high tax rates in the Lake States has been the
reappearance of tax delinquent lands on a surprising scale. In Minnesota
in 1971 there were 4 counties (Aitken, Cass, Hubbard, St. Louis) in
which tax forfeit lands were more than 20 percent of all land in the .—
county. In four other counties the percentage was over 15. And in
another 4, the percentage was 8-14.
In 1971, there were 5 counties in which tax forfeited land was over
40% of total private land in the county. In another 5 counties18
2/
the percentage was 21-40.-
One argument against the property tax inmral areas has been that
land is a declining input in agriculture, and therefore an eroding base
for rural taxation. The foundation for this argument was advanced
3/
persuasively in the early 1950’sby T.W. Schultz at the University of -
Chicago, who argued that land was no longer a limiting factor in agri-
cultural production. One inference for tax policy was that land as
a base for raising revenue should be abandoned if the community wished
to have a tax-base that was capable of keeping pace with technological
change.
But land aa an input in agriculture has not declinedin importance.
As a percentage of inputs into agricultural production, land in 1970
was 18 per cent of the total. This was the identical percentage that
was estimated for 1870, 1890, 1920 and 1930. It went up to 20% in
1910-15, and in 1955-60, but has remained remarkably constant as a
4/ fraction of total inputs over the past 100 years.-
Land as a base for taxation has not’deteriocaked. In fact, some
of the recent incentives to invest in land have attracted a class of
investor buyers or non-farm users that look upon their land purchases
q Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Commission, and
John J. Shea, “Tax Forfeiture and Land Ownership Problems in Minnesota”,
Ag. Econ. 8-360, Seminar in Land Tenure, University of Minnesota, March
15, 1972.
~] T.W. Schultz, The Economic Organization of Agriculture,
New York, McGraw-Hill, 1953~and especially chapter 8.
Y “Productivity: Index of Total Farm Input and Productivity, for
Each Farm Production Region, 1939-71”, Supplement for 1972 to Statistical
Bulletin No. 233, ERS, USDA, Oct. 1972, and supplemental historical data
supplied by FPED, ERS, USDA. See Appendix Table 1 for details.19
as consumption goods, or tax shelters. These types of buyers are in-
creasing the attractiveness of land taxation because of the relatively
inelastic nature of this type of demand for lands. Recreational and
tax-shelter types of land use are habit-forming and should be taxed
accordingly.
Although the property tax has been widely condemned, it is in-
structive to note that some of the grounds on which it has been criticized
are probably its greatest strengths.
Consider its lack of relation to ability to pay. In a system under-
going rapid change, subject to inflationary threats, and committed to the
maintenance of private property, the property tax is one of the stabilizing
elements in the value structure. The remedy lies in improving it, not
in abandoning it.
It is ironic that support for the property tax is declining at a
period in history in which we are at the threshold of a massive improve-
ment in our ability to prepare land tax and assessment records efficiently
and economically. Computerized land data systems and remote sensing
potentials promise to make the administration of the property tax much
more equitable and efficient than it has been in the past.
If we rank the components of our tax structure in terms of the impact
of computerized data systems on the ease and cost of administration,
it is clear that the property tax is the greatest beneficiary of this
form of new technology.
There is still another and more compelling reason why the property
tax merits our careful attention.
Historically, land taxes have been the device by which forced





has been the predominant use of property tax revenues, a
high rate of taxation has been endured.
revenues from a land (or property) tax have gone primarily
governments, the political cost of the property tax has
been measured in poor collections, high administrative costs and
widespread evasion. From the local or regional point of view, if the
revenue was taken out of the community it was “patriotic” to evade
taxes. A property tax used to finance needed local services was an
entirely different tax. Cheating or evasion were clearly at the
cost of your neighbors. Fiscal morality was promoted by this type of
tax.
One of the heritages we have enjoyed in the United States is s
relatively high level of tax morality. Tax evasion and tax cheating
occur, in the United States, but they are relatively rare. By comparison
with some of the countries of continental Europe, tax cheating in the
United States is a minor phenomenon.
It is difficult to explain this by any simple causal factor, but it
seems probable that one reason is the heavy use made of the property tax,
with revenues used for local roads and schools. This generated a population
of honest taxpayers, by making the cost of cheating an expensive social stigma.
We are desperately in need of institutions in our public life today
that relate tax burdens to tax benefits and that encourage honesty in tax
paying. The property tax has filled this role. It has had an influence
on our national life that is not measured by revenue raised. This argument
weighs heavily in the balance when assessing the merits of the property
tax in a modern fiscal system.Appendix Table 1
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USDA, ERS, October 1972, plus supplemental data—
supplied by ERS.